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Four West African nations have demanded the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda 
include a Cotton Initiative that involves two issues: cutting cotton subsidies and tariffs, 
and assisting farm productivity growth in Africa. This paper provides estimates of the 
potential economic impacts of (a) complete or partial removal of cotton subsidies and 
import tariffs globally and (b) cotton productivity growth through the adoption of 
genetically modified (GM) cotton varieties. Use is made of the latest version of the 
GTAP database and model. Our results confirm that – unlike for other agricultural 
subsidies and tariffs – for cotton it is subsidy reductions rather than tariff cuts that would 
make by far the largest impact. For Sub-Saharan Africa the potential gains are huge 
relative to the effects on them of reforming other merchandise trade policies. And they 
could be more than doubled if that reform provided the cash for farmers to take 
advantage of the biotechnology revolution and adopt GM cotton varieties. But those 
potential gains, and the affordability of switching to costly GM seed, depend crucially on 
the extent to which high-income countries are willing to lower domestic support to their 
cotton farmers. 
 
JEL codes: D58, F17, Q16, Q17 
Key words: subsidy and tariff reform, computable general equilibrium modeling, 
economic welfare, GMOs, cotton biotechnology 
 
  
WTO’s Doha Cotton Initiative: 






  For many developing countries, especially in Africa and Central Asia, cotton is an 
important cash crop. It is receiving attention of late because four poor cotton-exporting 
West African countries (the Cotton-4: Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali) have 
demanded that cotton subsidy and import tariff removal be part of the World Trade 
Organization’s Doha Development Agenda (DDA). Cotton subsidies are mostly provided 
by governments in high-income countries, and part of the US cotton subsidy program has 
been ruled illegal following a WTO dispute settlement case brought by Brazil. Hence 
some reform can be expected soon, especially if the DDA is to live up to its name of 
being a development round (Sumner 2006). 
  This paper seeks to provide estimates of what is at stake in terms of cotton 
production, trade and economic welfare in African and other developing countries. 
Specifically, how much would Sub-Saharan Africa gain from removal of all cotton 
subsidies and tariffs relative to removal of such distortions to other merchandise trade 
globally? How would the welfare of cotton-importing developing countries with export 
interests in textiles and clothing be affected by such reform? What would be the relative 
contributions of different countries’ policies – and of domestic supports, export subsidies 
and import tariffs – to the global gains from removal of those measures? And how would  2
the gains from full reform compare with the gains that could be expected if and when (a) 
the US complies with its WTO obligations as laid out in the WTO’s dispute settlement 
Panel and Appellate Body reports (WTO 2004b, 2005a) and (b) the partial reforms 
proposed in the Hong Kong Trade Ministerial meeting in December 2005 are 
implemented as part of the DDA? 
The Cotton Initiative under the WTO’s DDA has not only the trade policy reform 
component but also a development component (WTO 2004a,c). The latter is aimed at 
boosting the international competitiveness of cotton producers in low-income (especially 
West African) cotton-exporting countries. One prospective way to do that is for 
governments of those countries to allow the adoption of new varieties of cotton emerging 
from the biotechnology revolution, the affordability of which will be greater in the 
absence of cotton market distortions. We therefore compare the estimated gains from 
cotton subsidy and tariff reform with the prospective gain from wider adoption by 
developing countries of genetically modified (GM) cotton, and also ask: how much 
greater would be the gains to cotton-producing developing countries from GM cotton 
adoption if global cotton markets were not distorted by subsidies and tariffs?  
  After presenting a brief background to the world’s cotton market in Section 2, this 
paper seeks to address these questions by using a well-received model of global economy 
known as GTAP (developed by Purdue University’s Global Trade Analysis Project) and a 
slight modification of the latest version of its related trade and protection database, 
described in Section 3. Empirical simulation results are presented in Section 4 for full 
trade and subsidy reform and in Section 5 for partial cotton policy reform either by the 
US in response to the WTO dispute settlement case brought against it by Brazil or as  3
proposed at the Hong Kong Trade Ministerial of the DDA. These are then compared in 
Section 6 with the estimated effects of GM cotton adoption by various country groups. 
The paper concludes with a summary of findings and draws out implications for 
developing country negotiators in the WTO’s Doha round. 
 




Cotton production is highly concentrated in several respects. One is that most 
production is in a few countries: as of 2005/06, nearly half is produced by just China and 
the United States, and that rises to more than two-thirds when India and Pakistan are 
added and to more than three-quarters when Brazil and Ukbekistan are included. Also 
highly concentrated are exports of cotton lint, with the US, Australia, Uzbekistan and 
Brazil accounting for almost two-thirds of the world’s exports, while the cotton-four in 
West Africa and the other four countries in Central Asia bring that total to almost four-
fifths (Appendix Tables A1 and A2) Both production of cotton and its export patterns are 
distorted very considerably by subsidies to both as well as by tariffs on cotton, textiles 
and clothing imports (the size of which are shown in Appendix Table A3). 
Cotton production is also concentrated in the sense that a number of low-income 
countries depend heavily on cotton for earning foreign exchange. This is especially true 
of several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali) and in 
Uzbekistan where cotton accounts for more than one-fifth of merchandise exports and, 
for another six countries in those regions, cotton’s share is between 5 and 12 percent. In 
2002 all but three of those eleven African and Central Asian countries had average per  4
capita incomes of less than 80 US cents per day (Appendix Table A2). And since much 
of their cotton production is exported, they compete directly in international markets with 
highly subsidized exports from the United States. 
Cotton usage, on the other hand, is distributed across countries roughly in 
proportion to their volumes of textile production.
1 Because of high domestic usage by 
exporters of textiles and clothing in developing Asian countries (and Mexico because of 
its preferential access to the US and Canadian markets under NAFTA), even relatively 
large cotton producers such as China, Pakistan and India (see column 1 of Table 1) export 
only a small fraction of their crop, in contrast to Sub-Saharan Africa where textile 
production is relatively minor. This explains the pattern of net exports of cotton and 
textiles across regions (columns 2 and 3 of Table 1), an understanding of which is helpful 
in explaining the signs of the welfare effects of the technology and policy shocks 
considered below.   
 
3. The GTAP model and database 
 
 
The standard Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model of the global 
economy is used to provide insights into the likely effects of reforming cotton subsidy 
and trade policies globally and of governments allowing GM cotton technology adoption 
in some countries without and then with cotton trade and subsidy policy reform globally. 
The GTAP model (see Hertel (1997) for comprehensive documentation) is a neo-classical 
multi-regional, static, applied general equilibrium model that assumes perfect 
                                                 
1   That usage pattern has been distorted considerably by import tariffs on textiles and clothing, even 
after the removal by end-2004 of quotas restricting exports of those products from developing countries: 
compare the columns in Appendix Table A4 with and without protection as of 2005.  5
competition, constant returns to scale and unchanging aggregate employment of all 
factors of production. We use the latest Version 6.05 of the GTAP database (see 
Dimaranan and McDougall, 2005), which draws on global economic structures, policies 
and trade flows of 2001. The GTAP model has been aggregated to depict the global 
economy as having 27 sectors and 38 regions (to highlight the main participants in the 
world’s cotton markets, two of which are newly disaggregated countries: Nigeria and 
Pakistan). Trade is modeled using a nested Armington structure in which aggregate 
import demand for each sector’s product is the outcome of allocating domestic absorption 
between domestic goods and aggregate imports, and then aggregate import demand is 
allocated across source countries to determine the bilateral trade flows. 
Two modifications have been made to the structure of protection in Version 6.05 
of the GTAP database. One relates to cotton subsidies in the United States. In Version 
6.05, which reflects subsidy notifications to the WTO, the subsidies showing for the US 
in 2001 are much less than actually paid through its various and complex cotton 
programs: $1.0 billion as production subsidies and zero as export subsidies, compared 
with an average annual total payment of $3.0 billion for the 2000-2002 period according 
to Baffes (2005, Table 4, drawing on official data from the USDA). We therefore 
adjusted the subsidy rates to raise overall payments to that $3 billion level (of which 
direct payments and countercyclical payments are paid per unit of land, marketing loan 
benefits and crop insurance subsidies are paid as input subsidies, and coupled output 
payments plus Step 2 payments to US cotton textile producers and to US cotton 
exporters, along with export credit guarantees, are paid as production subsidies).
2 The 
                                                 
2   The latter two are export subsidies but, since an export subsidy is equivalent to a production 
subsidy plus a consumption tax at the same rate, and since US buyers of domestically produced cotton  6
resulting subsidy rates are shown in Appendix Table A3, along with information on the 
(relatively small) tariffs on cotton imports.
3 For the US it amounts to a production 
subsidy in 2001 of 40 percent. This may be conservative, as it compares with a recent 
projection for 2004-06 of 56 percent with the Step 2 program intact and 46 percent if it is 
repealed without re-instrumentation (Sumner 2005, Table 3). 
The other modification to the GTAP protection database is to take account of the 
completion of the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing by end-2004, at which time all trade-restricting quotas were abolished and were 
replaced by a tariff-only regime. We then recalibrate the model’s baseline by 
implementing that protection change, and the change in US cotton subsidy rates, before 
running the simulations described below.
4 
 
4. The global cost of cotton subsidies and tariffs  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
receive a consumption subsidy to compensate for the price-raising effect of the export subsidies on cotton, 
the two elements in the Step 2 program sum to the equivalent of just a cotton production subsidy. That 
program’s payments amounted to one-seventh of total dollars of cotton supports during 2000-02 (Baffes 
2005, Table 4) and, if it were not repealed, would amount to one-sixth during 2004-06 (Sumner 2005, 
Table 3).  In any case they were found to be illegal recently by the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Panel and 
Appellate Body (WTO 2004b, 2005a). As a result, on 1 February 2006 the US Congress agreed to reform 
both components of the Step 2 program by 1 August 2006. How this reform impacts the market depends on 
the extent of re-instrumentation of that portion of the overall support, as discussed on Section 5 below.  
3   No cotton subsidies are shown for China in the GTAP protection database, even though there have 
been some in past years. According to Huang, Rozelle and Chang (2004), the degree of protection varied 
from positive to negative during 2001 and the key intervention was an export subsidy. Since then China has 
committed to zero export subsidies, as part of its WTO accession agreement. Those zero entries in Table 
A3 also are consistent with the OECD’s recent Producer Support Estimates for China (OECD 2006), which 
for 2001 show no direct subsidy payments and a slightly negative nominal rate of protection for cotton 
producers.  For an up-to-date assessment of China’s cotton policies, see Shui (2005). 
4   US and other cotton subsidy programs have been the subject of intense analysis in recent years, 
although mostly by partial rather than general equilibrium modelers. For reviews of that literature, see FAO 
(2004), Baffes (2005) and Sumner (2006).  7
 What is the cost of current distortions to cotton markets or, equivalently, what 
would be the effects of eliminating all cotton subsidies and import tariffs, as called for by 
African cotton-exporting countries as part of the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda? 
Given the extent of subsidies to cotton production and exports, and of tariffs on cotton 
imports as of 2001 (modified as described in the previous section), we estimate using the 
GTAP model that their removal would boost global economic welfare by $283 million 
per year,
5 and would raise the price of cotton in international markets by an average of 
12.9 percent.
6 The price rise ensures that all cotton-exporting countries would benefit, 
while net importers of cotton would be worse off, as shown in the right-hand columns of 
Table 1. 
What is striking about the welfare effects is their distribution among developing 
countries (Table 2 and Figure 1). Especially noteworthy is the relatively large benefit 
bestowed on Sub-Saharan Africa, of $147 million per year. About two-fifths of that 
would go to the Cotton-4 and another one-fifth to other West African countries. This is 
driven by an estimated increase in Sub-Saharan African cotton output and net farm 
income of nearly one-third, and in the real value of the region’s cotton exports of more 
than 50 percent. By contrast, cotton output and exports would fall by one-quarter in the 
United States and would halve in the EU (middle columns of Table 1). That would raise 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s share of global cotton exports from 12 to 17 percent, and the share 
of all developing countries from 52 to 72 percent. 
                                                 
5   Of course if textile and clothing tariffs also were removed, global welfare would increase far 
more: by an extra $6.8 billion per year, according to our GTAP model results.  
6   This is almost identical to the 12.6 percent claimed by Brazil using a model developed by FAPRI 
(FAPRI 2005) and close to the 10 percent estimated by Sumner (2006, p. 282), which is also the simple 
average of the studies surveyed by Baffes (2005, p. 122) although the range reported by Baffes is up to 30 
percent. When we alter the GTAP trade elasticities to the larger ones used in the World Bank’s Linkage 
model (see van der Mesbrugghe 2005), our estimate of 12.9 percent falls to 11.9 percent.  8
Also striking is a comparison of the welfare result from cotton reform with that 
from removing all merchandise tariffs and agricultural subsidies. While the latter gain is 
nearly 300 times as great as the former globally, for Sub-Saharan Africa cotton reform is 
crucial: its potential contribution to the region’s welfare of $147 million per year is one-
fifth of the estimated $733 million gain for the region from the freeing of all goods 
markets globally, according to our GTAP model results. It is therefore not surprising that 
some African trade negotiators have threatened to walk out of the WTO’s Doha round of 
talks if substantial reforms to cotton policies are not included in the final Doha agreement 
– in which case the global cost of not reforming cotton would be many times greater than 
implied in Table 1.  
If the distortions to cotton markets were removed, the final row of Table 2 shows 
that the United States’ policy reform would be responsible for more than half of the 
global gain. Perhaps more surprising is the result that the EU25 is responsible for nearly 
all of the rest, but that is mainly because the cost of the EU’s policies to its own economy 
is so high. Even so, the estimated cost to Sub-Saharan Africa is only half due to US 
policies and only one-quarter to developing countries’ policies, with most of the rest due 
to EU cotton policies. The reason the latter are so much more important to Sub-Saharan 
Africa has to do with the pattern of bilateral trade in cotton. As shown in Appendix Table 
A5, Sub-Saharan African cotton is sold in direct competition with EU cotton in EU and 
East Asian markets.  
Table 2 also shows that export subsidy removal would contribute almost none of 
the global benefits from reform, and cotton tariff removal would account for only one-
ninth of the global gain, with the other eight-ninths due to cutting domestic support  9
programs. This latter result contrasts markedly with that for the removal of all 
agricultural subsidies and tariffs (to which cotton is a tiny contributor), whereby tariff 
removal accounts for a huge 93 percent of the global benefits and domestic support 
programs only 5 percent (Anderson, Martin and Valenzuela 2006).  
Turning to the impacts on cotton farmers’ incomes of such reform, Table 3 
suggests that they would decline by one-sixth in the United States and by just over half in 
the EU. In virtually all other regions, however, they are estimated to rise. Crucially, they 
would rise by a huge 30 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa and around 40 percent in West 
Africa in particular – more than three-quarters of which is due to cuts to domestic support 
programs. The relative distribution of those gains across key developing countries is 
depicted in Figure 2. It is no wonder that cotton-exporting countries in Africa are calling 
for large cuts to those subsidies as part of the Cotton Initiative within the WTO’s Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA), and for assistance to increase their cotton productivity and 
responsiveness to higher export prices. 
 
5. Prospective gains from partial reform of cotton subsidies and tariffs  
 
While the full reform results presented above are not likely to materialize in the 
immediate future, they provide a useful benchmark against which to compare the 
estimated effects of partial reforms. In this section we consider two partial reform 
scenarios: liberalization in the United States alone, as a possible response to the outcome 
of the WTO dispute settlement case brought against it by Brazil; and a broader 
liberalization consistent with what was agreed at the Hong Kong Trade Ministerial in 
December 2005 as part of the DDA.  10
 
US-only partial reform following the WTO dispute settlement case 
 
How much cotton reform can be expected in the United States as a result of the 
US being found not in compliance with its WTO obligations, as laid out in the WTO’s 
dispute settlement Panel and Appellate Body reports (WTO 2004b, 2005a)? The reports 
ruled that the Step 2 program and the export credit guarantees were prohibited export 
subsidies and domestic-content subsidies. They also ruled that all US cotton production 
subsidies are not minimally trade-distorting and so should be in the amber box rather than 
the green box (to use the terminology of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture). 
On the first, the US already has agreed to repeal the two parts of its Step 2 program 
(passed by the US Congress on 1 February 2006). That program provided an export 
subsidy to cotton producers and a consumption subsidy to US users of domestically 
produced cotton (the sum of which in economic terms is equivalent to a production 
subsidy of the same rate). At one extreme, if those dollars of support to US cotton 
farmers through the Step 2 program are completely re-instrumented to direct production 
subsidies, there would be effectively no global market impact of that repeal. At the other 
extreme, if there was zero re-instrumentation and the total expenditure on cotton support 
was reduced by the full amount of the Step 2 payments, this would be equivalent in 2000-
02 to a one-seventh reduction in the aggregate subsidy to US cotton production. 
Turning to the second part of the WTO ruling, if US cotton producer subsidies are 
now to be counted as part of the country’s amber box measures, they should not exceed 
the support provided in 1992 (the limit year under the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures), which was $2.0 billion. In fact payments in  11
2000-2002 averaged $3.0 billion, suggesting they should be cut by one-third in order to 
comply with the WTO ruling – or by more than twice the amount associated with 
repealing the Step 2 program even if there were no re-instrumentation of that program’s 
dollars to domestic producer support programs. 
To simulate a US reform that would fully comply with those WTO rulings, we ran 
a scenario in which not only the Step 2 program is removed but also domestic producer 
subsidies are cut by one-third, from $3 billion to $2 billion. The results are reported in the 
first columns of Tables 4 and 5, together with those from a more-extensive partial reform 
which we outline below. 
 
Partial reform that might be achieved in the WTO’s Doha round 
 
The WTO’s Hong Kong Trade Ministerial meeting of the Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA) in December 2005 agreed that cotton export subsidies be eliminated 
during 2006, that least-developed countries get duty free access for their cotton exports to 
high-income countries by the time implementation of the DDA commences, and that 
domestic cotton subsidies be reduced faster and more ambitiously than other agricultural 
domestic support programs during DDA implementation (WTO 2005b). How far might 
that go towards yielding the potential gains to low-income countries from full reform as 
reported above? To address this question, we ran another partial liberalization scenario in 
which we: 
•   remove all cotton export subsidies globally,  
•   remove tariffs on imports by all high-income countries (HICs) of cotton from 
pertinent UN-defined least-developed countries (LDCs, comprising South Asia  12
excluding India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka plus Sub-Saharan Africa excluding 
Nigeria and the Southern African Customs Union in terms of our regions),
7 and 
•   reduce by one-third all applied cotton production subsidies in all high-income 
countries (not just in the US as in the previous partial reform scenario).
8  
 
Comparison of the two partial-reform scenarios with the full-liberalization results 
 
Impacts of this Doha partial reform simulation and the US-only partial reform 
simulation on regional welfare and on cotton net farm income are reported in Table 4 and 
in Figures 1 and 2, and the effects on cotton output and exports are shown in Table 5, 
from which several points are worth stressing.  
First, the US-only reform would provide virtually all of the net benefits to the US 
economy that are generated by the Doha scenario, but only around three-fifths of the 
estimated net welfare and net cotton income effects, and two-fifths of the export effects, 
that Sub-Saharan Africa can expect from Doha cotton reform. Thus while the WTO 
dispute settlement case is potentially very helpful to non-US cotton producers, at best it is 
likely to generate barely half the benefits that could come from Doha cotton reform.  
Second, by showing there the contributions of trade measures (export subsidy and 
import tariff reform) separately, it is clear that virtually all the gains from the Doha 
                                                 
7    For the list of LDCs, see http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/list.htm. Due to regional 
aggregations in the GTAP dataset we use, our Sub-Saharan African group has some non-LDCs (including 
Zimbabwe, although it – like the three poorest Central Asian nations – probably now qualifies as an LDC) 
while LDCs in other regions are not so classified because they are too small a part of ‘rest of region x’ 
categories.  
8   There may be also some reduction in bound cotton tariffs as a result of the non-agricultural market 
access negotiations, but we ignore that by assuming applied tariffs are sufficiently below bound rates 
(‘binding overhang’) for the latter to remain unchanged, which is especially likely in developing countries 
as they are to be allowed to make lesser cuts than high-income countries (under so-called Special and 
Differential Treatment, SDT – see Anderson and Martin 2006). Similarly, because of binding overhang also 
in domestic subsidies, and SDT, we assume developing countries will not have to lower their cotton 
production subsidies.  13
partial reform would come from reducing domestic producer support programs. This is 
not surprising given the earlier results in Table 2 from full reform by instrument, and the 
knowledge that LDCs already enjoy close to duty free access to HIC markets through 
various preference schemes.  
Third, while the global welfare gains from the Doha partial reform are two-thirds 
those from full reform, much of the former would accrue to those cutting their domestic 
supports, most notably the United States. The overall welfare benefits from the Doha 
reform simulation to Sub-Saharan Africa and to Central Asia, by contrast, are only one-
quarter what they would be from full removal of all cotton programs. That is also true of 
the benefits to Sub-Saharan Africa’s cotton farmers. 
Fourth, Sub-Saharan Africa’s cotton output and exports would rise four times as 
much (and Central Asia’s two-and-a-half times as much) under full reform as under the 
Doha partial reform scenario. If the extent of reduction in applied domestic support to 
cotton farmers in HICs was less than the one-third assumed here, these differences would 
be even greater. That is, how much poor African countries and their cotton farmers gain 
from the DDA Cotton Initiative will hinge crucially on the extent of reform to applied (as 
distinct from WTO-bound) domestic subsidies. 
Finally, what difference would these scenarios make to the average price of cotton 
in international markets? Under full reform, that average price is estimated to rise by 12.9 
percent, while in the Doha and US-only scenarios it rises by just 4.4 and 3.2 percent, 
respectively. 
 
6. What impact would GM cotton adoption have on the gains from trade reform?  14
 
The Cotton Initiative involves two parts: in addition to trade and subsidy reform, 
the WTO’s General Council also has attached importance to development aspects of the 
Cotton Initiative, stressing the complementarity between the trade and development 
components (WTO 2004a,c). The latter is aimed at boosting the international 
competitiveness of cotton production in low-income countries. One prospective way to 
do that is for governments of those countries to allow the adoption of new varieties of 
cotton emerging from the biotechnology revolution. How do the above estimated gains 
from cotton subsidy and tariff reform compare with the prospective gains from wider 
adoption by developing countries of genetically modified (GM) cotton? And how much 
greater would be those gains to cotton-producing developing countries from GM cotton 
adoption if global cotton markets were not distorted by subsidies and tariffs, and vice 
versa?  
To simulate the economic effect of adoption of GM cotton, Anderson, Valenzuela 
and Jackson (2006) assume total factor productivity (TFP) in cotton production would 
rise by 5 percent in most adopting countries, net of any higher cost of GM seed. This 
output-augmenting, Hicks-neutral TFP shock is a conservative estimate of the gain to 
farmers, according to experience to date (Marra, Pardey and Alston 2002; Qaim and 
Zilberman 2003; Huang et al. 2004) and bearing in mind that typically, in a small number 
of years after GM cotton adoption is allowed, more than four-fifths of production moves 
to GM varieties. For India and Sub-Saharan Africa other than South Africa, however, a 
TFP shock of 15 percent is assumed. Even that higher value is conservative for those 
countries, according to Qaim and Zilberman (2003), because those countries’ yields per  15
hectare with conventional varieties are less than one-third yields in the rest of the world, 
and the GM field trials in India have been boosting yields by as much as 60 percent.
9 
Two GM cotton adoption simulations are presented, bearing in mind that by the 
GTAP Model’s base year of 2001 the US, Australia and South Africa had fully adopted 
GM cotton and China was half way through its adoption process. The first simulation has 
China completing its adoption process and all other countries except the rest of Sub-
Saharan Africa adopting GM cotton, while in the second simulation Sub-Saharan Africa 
also adopts.
10  
If all other countries adopt GM cotton, cotton output in the early-adopting 
countries falls in response to the output expansion in newly adopting regions. If Sub-
Saharan Africa continues to procrastinate, its cotton output, net farm income and exports 
would fall further. By contrast, if Sub-Saharan Africa also were to embrace this 
technology, its cotton industry would expand more than any other region’s, and this 
would more than make up its losses to 2001 from adoption by the first four adopters 
(Anderson, Valenzuela and Jackson 2006, Table 5).  
Even without Sub-Saharan Africa embracing this new biotechnology, global 
welfare would jump $2.0 billion per year if other countries adopt GM cotton; but 
adoption by the rest of Africa would raise that global benefit to $2.3 billion, with two-
thirds of that extra $0.3 billion being enjoyed by Africa. Asia’s developing countries that 
are net importers of cotton gain even if they grow little or no cotton (see columns 1 and 2 
                                                 
9   There are also benefits from insect-resistant Bt cotton in terms of improved health for farmers (see 
Hossain et al. 2004), and also less pesticide damage to soil and water, but these benefits are ignored in what 
follows.  
10   The reason it is worth examining separately the impact of adoption by the rest of Sub-Saharan 
Africa is that the region has a history of very slow adoption of new agricultural technologies in the 1970s 
and 1980s, and during the 1990s its investments in agricultural R&D grew only 1 percent per year and 
spending actually fell in about half the countries for which data exist (Science Council 2005).  16
of Table 6), because the international price of that crucial input into their textile industry 
would be lower in these scenarios. With complete catch-up as in the second of these 
scenarios, the gains to Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are ten, thirteen 
and twenty-three times greater than the global gains when expressed as a percentage of 
regional GDP (Anderson, Valenzuela and Jackson 2006, Table 6). South Asia’s are 
especially large because it is a large producer and user of cotton.  
The estimate of the global benefits from full GM cotton adoption by developing 
countries is eight times larger than the above estimate of the global gain from complete 
removal of all cotton subsidies and tariffs, and twelve times larger than the global gain 
from the Doha partial cotton reform simulation. The differences are less marked for Sub-
Saharan Africa, but even so its estimated gain from adopting GM cotton varieties is well 
above that from full removal of all trade-distorting cotton policies and around six times 
that from the Doha partial reform simulation considered above.  
If all distortions to cotton markets were removed, that global estimate would be 
virtually no different, for reasons explained in Alston, Edwards and Freebairn (1988) and 
Anderson and Nielsen (2004). But the gains to developing countries in the absence of 
distortionary cotton policies would be slightly greater (12 percent so in the case of Sub-
Saharan Africa), while those to high-income countries would be less (middle columns of 
Table 6).  
Were these two reforms (GM catch-up and subsidy removal) to occur 
simultaneously, they would reinforce each other in Sub-Saharan Africa as each expands 
the region’s cotton production and exports and so makes the gain from the other change 
larger. This is evident in the final column of Table 6, which shows that the gain to Sub- 17
Saharan Africa would then be ($223m + $147m =) $370m. This is equivalent to $199m + 
$172m, the former appearing in column 2 of Table 6 and the latter being the gain to Sub-
Saharan Africa from global removal of cotton subsidies and tariffs had GM catch-up 
occurred before that reform. Also, by comparing the final columns of Tables 4 and 6, and 
Figures 1 and 3, it is clear that while numerous cotton-importing developing countries 
lose from subsidy reform on its own, they gain when it is combined with the spread of the 
productivity enhancing GM cotton varieties. Clearly this is an example of 
complementarity between the trade and development components of the Doha Cotton 
Initiative. In terms of sequencing, subsidy cuts first would expand the capacity of poor 
farmers in low-income countries to purchase the more-expensive GM cotton seeds and 
make the necessary adjustments to their farming practices, and thereby increase the 
prospects of realizing the potential gains from GM adoption. 
Finally, note that if Sub-Saharan Africa procrastinates on GM adoption while 
other developing countries embrace the new technology, net incomes of cotton farmers in 
the region are estimated to fall by 7 percent, whereas they rise by 10 percent if Sub-
Saharan Africa also adopts.
11 That difference of 17 percentage points is large even 
compared with the 31 percent gain for the region’s cotton farmers from full removal of 
all cotton subsidies and tariffs globally, but it is even larger when compared with the 




                                                 
11   As well, the health of GM cotton farmers improves, and there is less contamination of water and 
soil, following the switch to the less chemically-intensive Bt varieties of GM cotton. These extra benefits 
are not included in the above welfare calculus.   18
 
The WTO’s Hong Kong Trade Ministerial meeting of the Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA) in December 2005 agreed that cotton export subsidies be eliminated 
during 2006, that least-developed countries get duty free access for their cotton exports 
by the time implementation of the DDA commences, and that domestic cotton subsidies 
be reduced faster and more ambitiously than other agricultural domestic support 
programs during DDA implementation. How far that will go towards full liberalization as 
examined above depends on the relative strengths of the pertinent negotiators in the 
DDA, but the above results make clear that it will hinge very heavily on the extent to 
which the US and to a lesser extent EU governments are willing to cut their applied 
domestic subsidies to cotton production. Potentially that Doha partial reform could 
deliver roughly twice the gains to cotton-exporting developing countries as the reform 
that – in the absence of the DDA – the US might be expected to do anyway to bring its 
cotton support programs into conformity with its WTO obligations. 
Meanwhile, there are other ways in which incomes of cotton farmers in 
developing countries can be enhanced. Adaptation and adoption of new genetically 
modified (GM) cotton varieties are one obvious way of contributing – and that is within 
the powers of developing countries themselves and so does not need to wait until that 
Doha round concludes. Indeed the above results suggest that developing country welfare 
would be enhanced by far more from allowing GM cotton adoption than by the removal 
of all cotton subsidies and tariffs.
12 Furthermore, our results support the notion that the 
                                                 
12   If embracing GM cotton helped developing country governments to streamline also the process of 
approving the release of GM varieties of food crops, these economies would be able to multiply their 
estimated $2.3 billion gain from GM cotton adoption by at least two, according to the numbers presented in 
Anderson and Jackson (2005) and Anderson, Jackson and Nielsen (2005).  19
gains to developing countries from reductions in trade-distorting cotton subsidies will be 
even greater if GM cotton is adopted first, providing yet another reason not to delay 
approval of this new biotechnology, especially since genetic modification of local cotton 
varieties and dissemination of the new technology to many small farmers will take some 
years. Perhaps some of the aid-for-trade funding that is being promised as a complement 
to the DDA could facilitate that process.  20
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Table 1: Cotton net farm income and net export positions in 2001, and impact of 
removing cotton subsidies and tariffs
a on cotton output, exports, net farm income and 
economic welfare 








































High-income countries  0.3  1.0 -92.0  -20 -15 -18  465  275 
Australia   3.8  1.1 -2.6  25  22  38  137  125 
United States   0.6  2.2 -60.7  -25 -18 -29  429  443 
EU25  0.1  -1.0 -28.8  -54 -53 -49  14  -109 
Japan   0.0  -0.4 -14.1  1  2  62  -24 -49 
Korea-Taiwan  0.1  -0.7 22.5  12  7 34 -61  -84 
Developing countries  3.8  -1.0 92.0  6  4 46  -182  -275 
E. Europe & C. Asia  4.3  0.3 7.4  7 3  36  -14  -36 
Turkey   11.6  -0.4 8.7  2 2  37  -86  -80 
Other ECA  2.1  0.7 -1.3  10  9  35  72  44 
East Asia  3.0  -1.4 60.4  2  2 72 -83  -127 
China   4.0  -0.1 41.9  2  2 76  50 45 
South Asia   14.5  -1.0 24.5  2  1 55 -96  -99 
Bangladesh   14.2  -0.3 3.8  8 5  68  -11  -21 
India   13.7  -0.6 11.9 -1  0 31 -85  -79 
Pakistan   29.9  -0.1 6.8  5 3  61 -7  -5 
M. East &North Africa  2.5  0.4 -3.3 6  6  37  19  26 
Sub-Saharan Africa  5.8  1.1 -1.8  32  31  55  147  113 
South Africa   0.3  -0.0 -0.2  19  21  47  -1 -2 
Mozambique   6.1  0.0 -0.0  19  18  29  2  1 
Zambia   11.6  0.0 0.0  4 4  11  0 0 
Uganda   6.8  0.0 -0.0  27  26  45  4  3 
Other Sthn & E. Africa  7.5  0.2  0.7  21 20 46  17 14 
Nigeria   2.2  0.0 -0.7  23  21  47  -1  0 
Other Sub-Sah. Africa  12.6  0.8  -1.6  39 37 60 126 97 
Latin America & Car.  1.1  -0.4 4.8  11 9  54  -155  -152 
Argentina   1.1  0.1 -0.4  14  11  66  7  6 
Brazil   1.5  0.1  -0.0  10 10 58  13 12 
Mexico   0.8  -0.5 4.0  13  11  42  -128  -136 
World  1.0  0.0 0.0  -1  -2 8  283 0 
 
a Removal of those distortions left after the phase-out of the quotas at the end of 2004  
b Exports minus imports, both valued at f.o.b. prices as in the GTAP database 6.05   25
c Cotton’s national share in GDP relative to the global share. In the GTAP database the 
sector is ‘plant-based fibres’ and so includes such products as flax (important only for 
Bangladesh in the above countries) 
 Source: Authors’ GTAP model simulation results  26
Table 2: Contribution to national economic welfare that would result from removing 
cotton subsidies and tariffs,
a by region and by policy instrument 
 
 (equivalent variation in income in 2001 US$ million) 




















High-income countries  374 109  0  -17  465  15  -7  457
Australia   109 14  8  6  137  2  2 134
United States   401 8 1  19  429  18  1 411
EU25  -64 110  -5  -28  14  6  -9 18
Japan   0  -15  -2 -7  -24  -4 -1 -19
Korea-Taiwan  -52  -3  -2  -5 -61 -8 0 -54
Developing countries  -224 22  -3  24  -182  13  7 -204 
E. Europe & C. Asia  -25 2 1  7  -14  1  0 -14 
Turkey   -61  -17  0 -9  -86  -1 -2 -83
Other ECA  38 24  1  7  72  2  2 69
East Asia  -54  -15  -6 -9  -83 -20 -2  -63 
China   60 -12  2  -1  50  -13  0 62
South Asia   -71  -5 -3 -17  -96  5  -1 -99 
Bangladesh   -11 -2 -1  2  -11  6  0 -16
India   -57 -6 -1  -20  -85  0  0 -84
Pakistan   -7 2 -2  0  -7  -1  -1 -5
M. East &North Africa  8 -4  1  14  19  1  8 10
Sub-Saharan Africa  72 33  4  39  147  32  2 112
South Africa   0 0 0  -1  -1  0  0 -1
Mozambique   1 1 0  0  2  0  0 1
Zambia   0 0 0  0  0  0  0 0
Uganda   2 1 0  0  4  0  0 4
Other Sthn & E. Africa  10 5 1  2  17  2  0 16
Nigeria   0 -1  0  0  -1  0  0 -1
Other Sub-Sah. Africa  59 27  3  36  126  30  2 93
Latin America & Car.  -154 9 0 -10  -155  -6  0 -150 
Argentina   2 3 0  2  7  2  0 4
Brazil   6 6 0  1  13  0  0 12
Mexico   -120  -2  0  -6  -128 -2 0 -125
World  149 130  -4  7  283  28  0 253
 
a Removal of those distortions left after the eventual phase-out of the quotas under the 
Multifibre Agreement at the end of 2004 
Source: Authors’ GTAP model simulation results  27
Table 3: Contribution to net incomes of cotton farmers that would result from removing 
cotton subsidies and tariffs,
a by region and by policy instrument 
 
(percent change in value added) 




















High-income countries  -12.9 -3.2 -0.4  1.2  -15.4 0.4  0.1  -15.9 
Australia   22.4 2.5  -4.2 1.5  22.2 0.2 0.3  21.6 
United States   -20.1 1.0 0.3 0.9  -17.9 0.3 0.1  -18.3 
EU25  8.6  -66.2 0.4 3.9  -53.3 2.3 0.5  -56.1 
Japan   2.9 0.2  -1.9 0.3 1.5 0.1 0.0 1.4 
Korea-Taiwan  7.2 0.6  -1.1 0.2 6.9 -0.3 0.0 7.2 
Developing countries  3.8 1.3 0.1  -0.9 4.3 -0.2  -0.1 4.6 
E. Europe & C. Asia  3.3 2.3 0.1  -2.4 3.3 0.0 0.1 3.1 
Turkey   2.8 1.3 0.1  -2.0 2.1 0.0 0.1 2.0 
Other ECA  4.3 4.0 0.2  -3.3 5.2 0.0 0.2 5.1 
East Asia  1.4 0.5 0.1  -0.1 1.9 -0.2 0.0 2.0 
China   1.1 0.5 0.0  -0.1 1.5 -0.2 0.0 1.7 
South Asia   1.9 0.3 0.1  -1.6 0.7 -0.7 0.0 1.4 
Bangladesh   2.9 0.5 0.2 1.4 5.0 0.7 0.1 4.2 
India   1.7 0.2 0.0  -2.4  -0.4 -1.1 0.0 0.7 
Pakistan   2.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 3.0 0.0 0.1 2.8 
M. East &North Africa  5.7 3.4 0.3  -3.2 6.1 -0.8  -1.9 8.8 
Sub-Saharan Africa  16.0 6.6 0.8 7.1  30.6 5.1 0.5  24.8 
South Africa   21.2 3.4 1.2  -5.1  20.6 -6.4 0.4  26.6 
Mozambique   10.2 12.7  0.4 -5.8 17.5 0.3  0.7 16.4 
Zambia   3.1 2.2 0.4  -2.0 3.6 -2.7 0.2 6.1 
Uganda   14.8 8.5 0.5 1.7  25.6 -0.3 0.5  25.4 
Other Sthn & E. Africa  11.6 5.0 0.6 2.5  19.7 1.0 0.4  18.3 
Nigeria   15.7 2.7 0.5 2.3  21.3 -0.2 0.3  21.2 
Other Sub-Sah. Africa  18.3 7.6 1.0 9.9  36.8 7.9 0.5  28.4 
Latin America & Car.  9.6 1.3 0.2  -1.8 9.4 -1.1 0.1  10.4 
Argentina   7.6 1.2 0.2 1.7  10.7 1.7 0.1 9.0 
Brazil   8.0 2.5 0.3  -0.5  10.3 0.3 0.2 9.9 
Mexico   12.8 0.4 0.1  -2.8  10.5 -0.3 0.0  10.9 
World  -1.4 -0.1  0.0 -0.2 -1.8 0.0  0.0 -1.8 
 
a Removal of those distortions left after the eventual phase-out of the quotas under the 
Multifibre Agreement at the end of 2004 
Source: Authors’ GTAP model simulation results  28
Table 4: Impact of US and Doha partial reform of cotton subsidies and tariffs on 
economic welfare and net incomes of cotton farmers, by region 
(equivalent variation in income in 2001 US$m, and percent change in value added) 





















Total    
Compliance 








High-income countries  210 -9  280  465 -4.1  0.1  -5.4  -15.4 
Australia   33 1  41  137 7.7  0.3  7.5  22.2 
United States   229 0  231  429  -6.6  0.1  -6.0  -17.9 
EU25  -29 -9  42 14  4.2  0.6  -20.9  -53.3 
Japan   3 -1  -4  -24  1.1  0  0.5  1.5 
Korea-Taiwan  -18 0  -20  -61 2.5 0  2.5  6.9 
Developing countries  -94 7  -88  -182 1.2  -0.1  1.7  4.3 
E. Europe & C. Asia  -10 0  -12  -14 1.1  0.1  2.1  3.3 
Turkey   -20 -1  -29  -86  0.9  0.1  1.5  2.1 
Other ECA  10 1  17  72 1.4  0.2  3.1  5.3 
East Asia  -23 -2  -33  -83  0.5  0  0.7  1.9 
China   19 0  15  50 0.4 0  0.6  1.5 
South Asia   -31 -1  -36  -96  0.7  0  0.9  0.7 
Bangladesh   -5 0  -6  -11 1.1  0.1  1.3  5 
India   -23 0  -27  -85 0.6 0  0.7  -0.4 
Pakistan   -4 -1  -5 -7  0.8  0.1  1.0  3.0 
M. East &North Africa  2 7  8  19 1.8  -1.7  1.3  6.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa  20 3  35  147 5.0  0.6  8.2  30.6 
South Africa   0 0  0  -1 6.5  0.3  8.5  20.6 
Mozambique   0 0  0 2 3.6  0.6  9.2  17.5 
Zambia   0 0  0 0 1.0  0.2  2.1  3.6 
Uganda   1 0  1 4 4.8  0.4  8.6  25.6 
Other Sthn & E. Africa  3 0  5  17 3.7  0.3  6.1  19.7 
Nigeria   0 0  0  -1 5.0  0.2  6.3  21.3 
Other Sub-Sah. Africa  16 3  29  126 5.6  0.7  9.4  36.8 
Latin America & Car.  -52 0  -50  -155 3.0  0.1  3.6  9.4 
Argentina   -1 0  0 7 2.2  0.1  2.8  10.7 
Brazil   0 0  2  13 2.3  0.2  3.4  10.3 
Mexico   -35 0  -36  -128 4.1 0  4.4  10.5 
World  116 -2  192  283   -0.4  0  -0.5  -1.8 
a ‘Trade measures’ consist of removal of all export subsidies and removal of tariffs on high-
income countries’ imports of cotton from LDCs; ‘Total’ adds a one-third cut in domestic support 
in high-income countries. 
b Reduction by one-third in cotton production subsidies (average 2000-2002) in U.S. alone. 
Source: Authors’ GTAP model simulation results  29
Table 5: Impact of US and Doha partial reform of cotton subsidies and tariffs on cotton 
production volume and real value of exports, by region 
(percent) 
 
Change in output volume (%)  Change in value of exports (%) 
 
Compliance 



















High-income countries  -5.3 -7.7  -20.4  -3.9 -6.6  -18.2 
Australia   8.6 8.3  25.0  11.8  12.3 38.1 
United States   -9.7 -8.9  -24.6  -11.8 -9.7  -29.0 
EU25  4.4 -21.7  -54.0  6.1 -18.5  -48.8 
Japan   1.1 0.3  0.7  13.5  11.8 61.9 
Korea-Taiwan  4.3 4.2  11.9  8.6  11.3 33.6 
Developing countries  1.5 2.1  5.7  8.5  12.8 46.3 
E. Europe & C. Asia  1.3 2.9  7.0  5.5  12.5 35.9 
Turkey   0.9 1.5  1.9  7.1  16.4 36.6 
Other ECA  1.6 4.1  10.0  5.3  12.2 35.0 
East Asia  0.6 0.8  2.4  14.1  18.8 71.9 
China   0.5 0.7  2.0  17.4  21.6 75.7 
South Asia   1.1 1.4  1.7  9.5  13.7 54.7 
Bangladesh   1.7 2.1  8.1  8.0  11.2 67.5 
India   1.0  1.2  -0.6  9.0  13.2  31.1 
Pakistan   1.2 1.6  4.7  11.7  16.5 60.6 
M. East &North Africa  1.8 1.3  6.2  9.1 7.1 37.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa  5.2 8.6  32.0  8.6  14.2 55.0 
South Africa   6.1 7.9  19.4  11.3  14.5 46.5 
Mozambique   3.8 9.9  19.0  4.9  12.9 29.2 
Zambia   1.0 2.2  3.8  2.8 6.1 10.8 
Uganda   5.1 9.1  27.3  8.2  14.6 44.5 
Other Sthn & E. Africa  3.9 6.5  21.1  8.2  13.4 45.6 
Nigeria   5.2 6.7  22.7  10.8  13.7 47.4 
Other Sub-Sah. Africa  5.8 9.8  38.8  8.7  14.7 59.6 
Latin America & Car.  3.5 4.3  11.0  15.3  15.7 54.0 
Argentina   2.7 3.5  13.6  12.7  16.3 66.1 
Brazil   2.2 3.3  9.8  11.0  16.7 57.6 
Mexico   5.3 5.1  13.0  13.4  14.4 42.3 
World  -0.2 -0.3  -0.8  1.1  1.3  7.9 
 
a Reduction of one-third in production subsidies (average 2000-2002) in U.S. alone 
Source: Authors’ GTAP model simulation results  30
Table 6: Prospective effects of completing GM cotton adoption globally post-2001 on 
national economic welfare and net cotton farm incomes, without and with cotton 
subsidies and tariffs removed 
  
 

























GM catch-up  
All high-income countries  318 366 279  744 
Australia   -14 -28 -58  80 
United States   61 57  -25  404 
       
All developing countries  1701 1957 2043  1866 
E. Europe and Central Asia  325 317 317  303 
China   113 100  94  144 
Other Southeast Asia   31 63 83 -48 
India  817 822 855  771 
Other South Asia   147 148 151  140 
Middle East & Nth Africa  157 175 211  194 
Sub-Saharan Africa   -13 199 223  370 
Latin American & Carib.  124 135 146  -8 
        
World 2018  2323  2322  2610 
        
(b) Effects on net cotton farm 
incomes (% change) in: 
    
        
All high-income countries  -2.7 -4.5 -5.0  -19.3 
Australia   -5.6 -9.3  -10.3  9.6 
United States   -2.7 -3.9 -3.7  -20.9 
       
All developing countries  -2.7 -2.2 -2.2  2.0 
E. Europe and Central Asia  -2.3 -3.1 -3.5  -0.3 
China   -1.7 -1.9 -2.0  -0.5 
Other Southeast Asia   -1.6 -1.9 -2.0  3.1 
India  -3.6 -3.9 -4.1  -4.5 
Other South Asia   -2.1 -2.5 -2.7  1.8 
Middle East & Nth Africa  -2.7 -4.5 -5.2  0.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa   -7.2 10.0  9.0  41.6 
Latin American & Carib.  -1.7 -3.4 -3.7  5.3 
       
World -2.7  -2.9  -2.9  -4.6 
Source: Anderson, Valenzuela and Jackson (2006)  31
Figure 1: Welfare gain from cotton tariff and subsidy reform as a percent of GDP, as a 
multiple of the share for the world as a whole 
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Source: Authors’ GTAP model simulation results  32
Figure 2: Percentage change in cotton farm income from reform of cotton tariffs and 
























Source: Authors’ GTAP model simulation results   33
Figure 3: Welfare change from the combination of cotton tariff and subsidy reform and 
post-2001 GM cotton adoption, as a percent of GDP, as a multiple of the percentage 
change for the world as a whole 
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Appendix Table A1: Volume of cotton




























ha, % of 
global 
average
China  5819 9  10  2800  8600 0  23.5  0.1  163 
United  States  4735  408  3039  7  1296  70 19.1 37.5  122 
India 4250  550  225  125  3600  6  17.1  2.8  63 
Pakistan  2308  42  100  250  2415  4 9.3 1.2  103 
Brazil  1191 -85  425 50  900  33 4.8 5.2  161 
Uzbekistan  1100 14  837 1  250 77  4.4  10.3  110 
Turkey  805 0  25  770  1550 3  3.2  0.3  181 
Australia  496  -97  582   11 98  2.0  7.2  258 
Greece  358  6  258  5  100  73 1.4 3.2  144 
Syria  298  -9  150    158  49 1.2 1.9  192 
Egypt  263  -8  125 75  220  46 1.1 1.5  137 
Burkina  Faso  254 -14  264    4  99 1.0 3.3  64 
Mali  250  -1  247    4  98 1.0 3.0  68 
Turkmenistan  219  6  114    100  54 0.9 1.4  52 
Tajikistan  162  6  132   25 85  0.7  1.6 80 
Argentina  155  -5 50 20  130  31 0.6 0.6  63 
Mexico  152 -33 45  287  428  24 0.6 0.6  169 
Kazakhstan  147  5  134 5 12 94  0.6  1.7 99 
Benin  140 -49  186    3  98 0.6 2.3  67 
Côte  d'Ivoire  124 11  103   10 91  0.5  1.3 62 
Iran  120 0  10  10  120 8  0.5  0.1  114 
Cameroon  112 -78 57  1  132  30 0.5 0.7  69 
Spain  110  0  63  15 62 57  0.4  0.8  178 
Sudan  96 0  92  4  96  0.4  1.1  67 
Tanzania  96  -24  104   16 87  0.4  1.3 31 
Paraguay  90 42  43    5 90  0.4  0.5 49 
Nigeria  87  2  30  15 70 35  0.4  0.4 33 
Zambia  76  0  55   20 72  0.3  0.7 39 
Chad  72  -5 77    1  100 0.3 0.9  33 
Zimbabwe  72  -13  58   26 68  0.3  0.7 36 
Peru  70 1  2  23  90 3  0.3  0.0  118 
Togo  70  -9 79    0  100 0.3 1.0  54 
Myanmar  59  0  11   47 19  0.2  0.1 29 
Colombia  55  21   78  111  0 0.2 0.0  109 
Azerbaijan 55 5  41  8  82  0.2  0.5  71 
Kyrgyzstan 38 0  39  3 3  103  0.2  0.5  121 
Uganda  37  -5 38    4  90 0.1 0.5  52 
Mozambique 25  -3 26    2  93 0.1 0.3  16 
Ethiopia  22 0  2    20 9  0.1  0.0  38 
South  Africa  21 0    39  60 0  0.1  0.0  73 
Source: ICAC (2005). 
a Cotton, refers to ginned lint or raw cotton. It does not include seed cotton, linters, cotton mill waste, or 
cotton fibers subjected to any processing other than separation of lint from seed by the gin. Annual data are 
for the cotton year beginning 1 August. 
b Supply is output plus change in stocks.  35
Appendix Table A2: Dependence of cotton-producing developing countries on cotton 
export earnings, average 2000-02 
 





























Benin  46.8  131 1.9 1.9  380 
Burkina  Faso  37.2  94 1.4 3.3  250 
Chad  32.9  59 0.9 4.2  210 
Uzbekistan  23.8  747 11.1 15.3  310 
Mali 22.4  161  2.4  17.7  240 
Tajikistan 12.3  89  1.3  19.0  180 
Togo 9.1  35  0.5  19.5  270 
Turkmenistan 7.6  201  3.0  22.5  1120 
Kyrgyzstan 6.7  33  0.5  23.0  290 
Zimbabwe 6.3  133  2.0  25.0  <730 
Guinea-Bissau 5.0  3  0.0  25.0  130 
Paraguay 4.9  58  0.9  25.9  1170 
Cameroon 4.6  87  1.3  27.2  550 
Tanzania 4.0  31  0.5  27.6  290 
Syria 3.9  221  3.3  30.9  1130 
Central African Rep.  3.8  6  0.1  31.0  250 
Egypt 3.2  216  3.2  34.2  1470 
Côte d'Ivoire  3.2  137  2.0  36.2  620 
Sudan 2.9  50  0.7  37.0  370 
Greece 2.6  276  4.1  41.0  11660 
Mozambique 2.1  14  0.2  41.3  200 
Uganda 1.7  8  0.1  41.4  240 
Australia  1.5  943 14.0 55.4  19530 
Malawi 1.2  5  0.1  55.4  160 
Senegal 1.1  9  0.1  55.6  470 
Kazakhstan 0.9  85  1.3  56.8  1520 
Pakistan 0.9  85  1.3  58.1  420 
Zambia 0.8  9  0.1  58.2  340 
Ethiopia 0.8  4  0.1  58.3  100 
Guinea 0.5  3  0.0  58.3  410 
Bolivia 0.4  5  0.1  58.4  900 
Gambia 0.4  0  0.0  58.4  270 
Ghana 0.3  5  0.1  58.5  270 
United States   0.3  2121  31.5  90.1  35400 
Azerbaijan 0.3  6  0.1  90.2  710 
WORLD  0.1  6656 100.0 100.0  5510 
Source: FAOSTAT database at www.fao.org, except for final column which is from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2004 for the year 2002.  36
Appendix Table A3: Cotton subsidies and import tariffs in 2001, and average applied 





















High-income countries  3461  33.8  0.0 0.2  6.3  8.6 
Australia 27  2.2  0 0.0  11.6  22.0 
United States  2969  40.2  0 0.6  7.3  9.4 
Canada 2  7.1  0 0.0  5.8  14.0 
EFTA 17  26.6  0 0.0  1.2  1.1 
EU25 430  39.3  0 0.0  6.4  7.9 
Japan 12  3.7  0 0.0  6.4  9.2 
Korea & Taiwan  1  1.5  0 0.7  8.6  12.2 
Hong Kong & Singapore  0  0.0  0 0.0  0.0  0.0 
Developing countries  450  1.5  0.4 2.6  11.2  18.4 
E. Europe &Central Asia  153  2.3  0 0.1  8.8  16.6 
Russia 27  14.8  0 0.2  9.5  18.7 
Turkey 115  3.9  0 0.0  13.3  19.9 
Other E. Europe & CA  10  0.3  0 0.4  7.1  13.2 
East Asia and Pacific  0  0.0  0.0 2.0  9.7  15.5 
China 0  0.0  0 2.8  8.9  15.7 
Indonesia 0  0.0  0 0.2  8.3  12.5 
Malaysia 0  0.0  0 0.0  11.7  15.0 
Philippines 0  0.0  0 1.1  6.0  12.8 
Thailand 0  0.0  0 4.6  17.0  26.0 
Viet Nam  0  0.0  0 0.0  30.4  39.1 
Other SE Asia Pacific   0  0.0  0 2.4  3.4  3.1 
South Asia  235  2.9  0.0 3.8  20.8  20.0 
Bangladesh 0  0.0  0 0.9  29.5  36.6 
India 235  4.4  0 7.0  26.2  18.9 
Pakistan 0  0.0  0 0.2  1.2  8.0 
Sri Lanka  0  0.0  0 2.3  14.9  19.0 
Other South Asia  0  0.0  0 0.0  8.2  8.7 
Middle East & N. Africa  26  0.9  2.4 6.1  16.2  21.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa  1  0.1  0 6.3  10.6  18.5 
South Africa  0  0.0  0 10.3  19.2  31.4 
Other SACU  0  0.0  0 0.4  12.7  7.4 
Malawi 0  0.0  0 2.1  19.9  18.7 
Mozambique 1  5.3  0 0.1  16.6  22.4 
Zambia 0  0.0  0 3.0  7.7  28.9 
Other Southern Africa  0  0.0  0 6.1  10.1  14.6 
Nigeria 0  0.0  0 1.4  30.1  36.0 
Uganda 0  0.0  0 0.6  22.6  28.9 
Other Sub-Saharan Africa  0  0.0  0 0.0  0.8  8.4 
Latin America and Car.  36  1.5  0.0 4.1  10.5  17.2 
Argentina 2  0.6  0 1.4  16.2  15.4 
Brazil 9  1.3  0 3.8  11.7  14.8 
Mexico 25  4.5  0 0.8  5.2  10.5 
Other Latin Amer & Car.  0  0.0  0 9.9  13.5  20.8  37
a GTAP database Version 6.05, with tariffs updated to 2005 following phase-out of textile 
and clothing quotas, and assuming a cotton output subsidy in the US of 40 percent in 
2001. 
Source: Update of GTAP database Version 6.05 at www.gtap.org  38
Appendix Table A4: Value of textile production with and without protection,
a by region, 
2001 
(percent) 
Region’s share of global 
textile production 
Share of textiles in value of 














China  24.5  26.0 8.7 9.2 
United States  17.3  15.6 2.5 2.3 
EU25  14.8  14.0 2.0 1.9 
Korea & Taiwan  5.7 7.3 5.6 7.1 
Japan  5.5 6.0 1.6 1.8 
India  4.5 4.5 7.5 7.5 
Other Eastern Europe & CA  4.5 4.0 4.6 4.1 
Mexico  2.5 2.1 3.5 3.0 
Other Latin Amer & Carib  2.3 2.0 3.8 3.4 
Middle East & Nth Africa  2.0 1.6 2.2 1.8 
Indonesia  1.8 2.1 7.6 8.6 
Pakistan  1.8  1.9 25.2 26.5 
Turkey  1.5 1.5 9.5 9.1 
Brazil  1.5 1.4 3.0 2.9 
Thailand  1.4 1.6 7.1 7.8 
Hong Kong & Singapore  1.3 1.9 6.1 7.5 
Other SE Asia & Pacific  1.1 1.2 8.4 8.9 
Canada  1.0 0.9 1.6 1.3 
Bangladesh  0.9  0.8 14.7 12.9 
Malaysia  0.5 0.6 2.5 3.1 
South Africa  0.4 0.4 3.0 2.6 
Australia  0.4 0.3 1.4 1.2 
Argentina  0.4 0.3 2.0 1.8 
Philippines  0.3 0.4 2.7 3.2 
Russia  0.3 0.3 0.8 0.8 
EFTA  0.3 0.3 0.9 0.8 
Other Southern Africa  0.3 0.2 4.7 4.0 
Other Sub-Saharan Africa  0.3 0.3 2.2 2.1 
Sri Lanka  0.2  0.2 10.8 10.3 
Other South Asia  0.2 0.2 8.8 8.6 
 
a “Without protection” refers to what production would be without subsidies and tariffs in 
the cotton, textile and clothing markets globally, as generated by the GTAP model 
 
b Same list of countries as in Appendix Table A3 and sorted according to region’s share 
of global textile production in 2001. Regions with less than 1 percent share of the global 
market are not shown. They are Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Other SACU, Singapore, 
Uganda, Viet Nam, and Zambia.  
 
Source: GTAP database 6.05 and authors’ GTAP model simulation results  
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United  States  0  0 109  670  110 559 547  292  23  488  172  1 3054 
Australia 0  0  64  285  28  414  149  0  6  0  3  3  954 
EU25 5  0  422  13  92  12  38  148  29  0  5  2  779 
High-income East Asia  0  0  0  0  1  6  24  0  0  0  0  0  36 
China 0  0  12  39  0  11  1  1  0  0  0  0  65 
Other East Asia  4  0  8  5  9  2  4  0  0  0  0  0  38 
South Asia  3  2  29  22  18  40  84  11  8  0  5  5  230 
E. Europe/Central Asia  14  1  504  88  17  13  87  427  11  0  7  0  1179 
Middle East/N. Africa  13  0  165  25  19  41  121  54  31  0  9  3  489 
Mexico 2  0  5  8  1  3  0  0  0  0  8  0  29 
Other Latin America  8  0  58  13  4  42  75  17  2  4  82  5  315 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  0  0 326  89  8 227  95  23  43  4  91  77  999 
WORLD 63  4  1705  1261  308  1399  1249  977  158  497  385  98   
 
 
a GTAP database Version 6.05, with tariffs updated to 2005 following phase-out of textile and clothing quotas, and assuming a cotton 
output subsidy in the US of 40 percent in 2001. The inclusion in this table of other plant-based fibres such as flax is important only for 
a few developing countries such as Bangladesh. 
Source: Update of GTAP database Version 6.05 at www.gtap.or CIES DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
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